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Leonard Woolf, the League of Nations, and Peace between the Warsi 
For publication in: The Political Quarterly 86 (4) 2015 
Peter Wilson, London School of Economics and Political Science 
Abstract 
Co-founding The Political Quarterly was one among many of Leonard Woolf’s 
achievements during a long career as a progressive political thinker and publicist, 
particularly in the field of international affairs. To mark the centenary of the 
publication of International Government, his most innovative and influential work on 
the subject, this article seeks to assess Woolf’s contribution. It examines the Fabian 
background to Woolf’s work, his support for and approach to the League of Nations, 
and his commitment to collective security as an approach to peace. Through a 
broader understanding of the League it argues that certain failings in the area of 
collective security, however profound, should not be permitted to blight an otherwise 
impressive intellectual legacy. 
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The prominent Fabian and Labour Party intellectual Leonard Woolf not only co-
founded the Political Quarterly, he edited it for almost 30 years and was one of its 
most frequent and insightful contributors. The publication free online of 12 of his 
most celebrated essays (‘Leonard Woolf at the Political Quarterly’ 25 November 
2014) brings Woolf’s insight, along with the humour and humanity which he brought 
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to so many subjects, to a new audience. These qualities are nowhere better 
displayed than in the field in which he made his name, international affairs. It is 100 
years since his first substantial contribution to this subject appeared in the form of 
two special supplements to the New Statesman. These later formed the kernel of his 
influential International Government (1916). Thus began Woolf’s, and for all intents 
and purposes the Fabian Society’s (some might even say Labour’s), search for the 
foundations of a more rational international order. International affairs could not 
simply be left to vein and sometimes venal statesmen, or class-biased diplomats, or 
hide-bound generals and other ‘men of affairs’. International affairs needed to be 
democratised, meaning not only the practices of international affairs but the whole 
business of thinking about them. In the powerful Fabian slogan ‘Educate, Agitate, 
Organise’ there was no question in Woolf’s mind which came first. The ‘common 
man’ with his often uncommon wisdom needed to be educated to think clearly and 
effectively about this seemingly new dimension to his communal life. He needed to 
be given the facts, the right facts, not capitalist or imperialist facts, about 
international life before he could take up his new role in shaping it. 
 Here and elsewhere Woolf presented with Webb-like certainty ‘the facts’ of 
international life: about the nature of the international system; the dynamics and 
direction of change; the role of ideas and institutions; the causes of war; and a whole 
host of other matters. In the process he forged a multi-dimensional worldview, a 
Fabian or welfare internationalism that challenged orthodox ‘common sense’ or 
‘realist’ views. But Woolf sought to make his view coherent without substituting one 
set of dangerous oversimplifications for another; and he did this by resorting to a set 
ideas about the relationship between national and international interests, the growth 
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of international government, the role the League of Nations, and the increasing 
importance to civilised life of peace. 
 On the occasion of the centenary of the publication of International 
Government this article seeks to asses Woolf’s worldview, in particular his approach 
to the League and his commitment to collective security as an approach to peace. 
 
The Fabian Background 
Until Woolf came along the only significant Fabian foray into thinking about 
international relations was George Bernard Shaw’s Fabianism and The Empire 
(1900). For many years this was seen as the seminal Fabian document on the 
subject, and International Government merely Fabianism and the Empire Mk II. But, 
leaving aside the different empirical foci of the two works (the South African War in 
Shaw’s case, the Great War in Woolf’s), there are important differences of general 
interpretation between the two. One concerns nationalism. Shaw maintained that 
nationalism was an obsolete political doctrine. Increasingly Great Powers would act 
as Great Responsibles, i.e. not in their narrow self-interests but in the interests of 
civilisation as a whole. Great Powers possessed great power but their true greatness 
resided not in the fact of their power but their capacity to do great deeds—which they 
increasingly would as they became permeated with Fabian ideals. For Shaw, the 
logical conclusion of the Fabian doctrine of the ‘inevitability of gradualness’ was 
Fabian world government. Woolf, however, was not so sure. Nationalism was still a 
force to be reckoned with. World government, Fabian or otherwise, was not 
inevitable, it might not even be desirable.  
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Woolf’s views on nationalism are most clearly revealed in his analysis of the 
Versailles settlement. This he saw as Janus-faced. The horror of the 1914-1918 war 
produced a strong reaction against nationalism. But it also produced a deep desire 
for vengeance. Nationalism was a cause of the war, but also, in the creation of a 
patchwork of small states in eastern and southern Europe, one of its chief 
consequences. The Versailles conference was dominated by the nationalists, but 
being pragmatists they were compelled to listen to the American President and the 
‘cry of the people’ for an ‘end to war’. Thus the Wilsonian League came to be 
superimposed on an essentially nationalist territorial, military and economic 
settlement. Or as Woolf eloquently put it, the building than began as an Arc de 
Triomphe was hastily finished off with the ‘stucco cupola of a Temple of Peace’.ii It is 
fair to say that Woolf’s subsequent engagement with nationalism was more 
polemical. But his early writings show he had a subtle appreciation of the nature of 
the problem. Part of that problem was its psychological embeddedness. People had 
a habit of clinging on to old beliefs long after they had become obsolete. This was 
just as much a fact to be reckoned with as material obsolescence. Nationalism as a 
mode of economic organisation had become dysfunctional in the modern age of 
economic interdependence, but this did not mean it would simply wither away. 
 In this and in other respects International Government reads today like a 
much more modern book than its better-known predecessor. For example, if one 
looks at assumptions about the causes of war, Fabianism and the Empire is locked 
into what A. J. P. Taylor in The Troublemakers (1957) called the ‘dissenting tradition’ 
of British foreign policy. The causes of war are located wholly at the level of the 
state. The analysis, to use Kenneth Waltz’s term in his seminal Man, the State, and 
War (1959) is entirely ‘second image’. War is the result of corrupt or illegitimate 
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governments. It is a conspiracy of the ruling against the working class. It is the result 
of capitalist manipulation of the press, parliament, and the political process. It is 
basically a product of state manipulation and/or dysfunction. Woolf does not dismiss 
these factors. After all, Woolf the Fabian social investigator was also Woolf the 
Labour Party activist and polemicist—he rarely missed an opportunity to take a pot 
shot at Tories, capitalists, financiers, generals, aristocrats, and so on. But he 
attaches much more importance to the nature of the international system. His 
analysis is predominantly ‘third image’. It is lack of international organisation, or the 
right kind of international organisation, and perhaps the right kind of ‘international 
psychology’ to go with it, where the cause of war chiefly resides. 
 
The League of Nations 
In the wake of some great social calamity people always search for something new. 
The need is as much emotional as intellectual. The recriminations which typify the 
early phases of a conflict begin to subside. The question becomes: what do we do 
now? The answer almost always given is: whatever we do we must not return to the 
past. The old order becomes irredeemably associated with failure. Hopes for the 
future become invested in ‘new orders’ however hollow they later prove to be. This 
was certainly true of 1919. The creation of the League of Nations was a response to 
an emotional as much as a political need. The lessons of Sarajevo in 1914 did not 
seem to have been learned by the statesmen of Versailles in 1919. National 
jealousy, suspicion, animosity and ambition still seemed to be the order of the day. A 
symbol of hope was needed. The war-weary nationalist leaders of Europe 
understood this as much as their idealistic American counterpart, then riding a tidal 
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wave of popularity in Europe if not at home. It was on this psychological foundation 
that the League of Nations was built. In Woolf’s words ‘Geneva was created as an 
antidote to Serajevo and Versailles’.iii 
 An important contribution of International Government was to buttress the 
emotional appeal of the League with some sound analysis of the evolution of 
international cooperation. Sharing the Fabian fear of being dismissed as ‘idealistic’ or 
‘utopian’, Woolf was at pains to point out that the ‘supernational authority for the 
prevention of war’ he was proposing was not something completely new. Rather it 
stood in a long line of institutional development. This was the growth of international 
government, which had its roots in the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century, 
and had experienced rapid growth with the communications revolution of the 
nineteenth. He defined international government as ‘the regulation of relations 
between states, nations or peoples by international agreement’iv and it took three 
forms. Firstly, Great Power international government. This involved the Great 
Powers increasingly coming together in concerts, conventions, and congresses in 
order to discuss and settle matters of common interest, particularly those that 
threatened to disturb ‘the peace of Europe’. Secondly, international government 
through adjudication. This involved the resort by states and other international actors 
to judicial and quasi-judicial procedures to settle their disputes, increasingly involving 
awards, decisions, or rulings from courts and tribunals. Thirdly, cosmopolitan 
international government. This took the form of the growth of a wide range of formal 
and informal associations and bodies between and across states in areas such as 
trade, transport, postal services, the telegraph, labour organisation, public health, 
science, medicine, sport, and literature.v 
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 Far from being new, therefore, a good deal of government, in the sense of 
what today we would call ‘global governance’, existed when the League of Nations 
came into being on 1 January 1920. And all of Woolf’s three strands could be found 
running through the League Covenant. ‘Great Power international government’ was 
manifest in the composition and prominent role of League Council, effectively an 
executive council of the victorious Great Powers. ‘International government through 
adjudication’ was manifest in the heightened status given to arbitration and judicial 
settlement—particularly through the creation of a Permanent Court of International 
Justice. ‘Cosmopolitan international government’ was manifest in the setting up of a 
wide range of League committees and commissions, often comprised of experts not 
the usual state representatives. 
In the nineteenth century the growth of international government had been 
largely spontaneous, part and parcel of the process of industrial modernity. With the 
arrival of the League the opportunity arose to put this development on a much more 
organised footing. This was important because a dangerous gap had opened up 
between the organisation of the economic and social life of the world (increasingly 
international, indeed cosmopolitan) and the organisation of its political life (with its 
attachment to the nominally sovereign and independent nation-state). This gap had 
become a major breeding ground for international tension. Indeed, it was the 
fundamental reason why the world had found itself at war in 1914, even though it 
was not in the true interests of any nation to fight it. Old habits die hard, especially 
old mental habits. While the economic, social, cultural and scientific organisation of 
the world had become more international, the political mindset remained narrowly 
patriotic. People gave their allegiance to only one unit, their nation, and they 
identified their interests passionately and exclusively with that unit. They failed to 
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notice that many avenues of life now by-passed the nation, and it was increasingly 
incapable of satisfying their needs. The supposedly independent nation-state was 
incompatible with the complex material world and the aims, desires and modes of 
modern life. 
This is important as it betrays an understanding of the League unfamiliar to 
many readers today. The League is generally seen as a collective security 
organisation, an executive agency for the prevention of war. But for Woolf the 
League was not only a collective security organisation. It was not only an executive 
agency to be called upon in times of emergency. Rather, it was a focal point for a 
wide network of international cooperation and a vital source of an ingredient 
essential for the future peace of the world—internationalist psychology. Allied to this 
Woolf spoke against those who saw the League merely as an ideal, or something 
good for foreigners but not really necessary for ‘us’.vi These views were corrosive. 
The League was a practical body of working internationalism the whole point of 
which was to break down the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The League as 
constituted was not perfect, but it offered a reasonable starting-point for getting the 
world on a much more organised and orderly footing, confining the international 
anarchy of irresponsible sovereign states to the past. 
 
The Failure of the League? 
Woolf along with many internationalists of his time is associated with the League and 
the League is associated with failure. But the question of League failure is far more 
complex than conventionally understood. Firstly, the League was institutionally 
complex. It consisted of a Council, an Assembly, a Court, and a Secretariat headed 
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by a Secretary-General. But it also comprised the International Labour Organisation, 
still going strong; commissions on minorities, mandates and disarmament; expert 
committees on health, finance, economics, and intellectual cooperation; and much 
else. Many of these bodies conducted useful work. Some of it, indeed, was ground-
breaking. This was particularly the case with the economic and social work of the 
League as extolled in the Bruce Report of 1939. More could be said on this broad 
and complex matter, but the point is that failure did not extend into every corner of 
the League’s activities, far from it. 
 Secondly, it should not be assumed, though it often is, that the raison d’etre of 
the League was universally accepted. Different countries looked at the League in 
different ways. As early as 1925 the prominent international lawyer William Rappard 
contended in his International Relations as Viewed from Geneva that there were at 
least three Leagues. All three concerned ‘security’, but conceived in quite different 
ways. Firstly, there was the League as seen from France. This was the ‘League to 
execute the peace treaties’. Its main job was to uphold the post-war territorial 
settlement. Secondly, there was the League as seen from Britain. This was the 
‘League to outlaw war’. Its main job was to ensure disputes between states were 
settled peacefully. It was less concerned with the territorial outcome of the war than 
that there should not be another. Finally, there was the League as seen by its poorer 
and/or weaker members. This was the ‘League to promote international cooperation’. 
Its concern was not so much the political settlement of Europe as worldwide social 
and economic development. Rappard’s ‘three Leagues’ was an early expression of 
the modern constructivist view that institutions are not monolithic but malleable 
structures constantly in the process of being made and remade. Beyond its physical 
manifestation in the Palais des Nations in Geneva the League consisted of a fairly 
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flexible set of rules, principles and procedures. It was up to its members to decide 
what to do with them. The League was what its member-states made of it; and 
different states tried to make of it different things.  
Thirdly, overlapping with these three conceptions of the League can be found 
vying for attention four general philosophical positions. The first and most famous is 
Wilsonian internationalism. In the spirit of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points this 
position stressed national self-determination, free trade, open diplomacy, and the 
role of world public opinion. It viewed the League as an agency for realising the 
President’s liberal democratic agenda: making the world safe for democracy, but 
also capitalism. The second was realism—or what came to be known as realism 
after 1945. According to this position the League was an instrument of power, in 
particular of Great Power. It did not represent a break with the past but a 
continuation of power politics by other means; either that or the latest fig leaf to cover 
the naked pursuit of power that characterised international life. The third was 
ameliorism. The League did not represent a break with the past but it did provide 
new means of modifying conventional habits and practices. In the wake of a 
calamitous war the League embodied the felt need of the world’s statesmen for new 
channels of communication, new sources of information, and new means of dispute 
resolution. The League did not replace power politics but sought to contain it. Finally 
there was the progressive internationalist position. This was the one that Woolf 
identified with and, indeed, helped to create. The League was not perfect but it 
represented the beginning of something new, a new system of pacific 
internationalism. The League was not merely a new diplomatic tool (as conceived by 







This brief sketch suffices to show that that the League was a house with many 
mansions. Its reputation as a blanket failure is far from deserved. Any sober 
assessment requires, at a minimum, that the different roles and functions of the 
League’s various agencies be taken into account—along with the many different 
expectations that this first experiment in universal political organisation generated. 
Yet even if we restrict ourselves to a narrow interpretation of the League, i.e. the 
League as a collective security organisation, the question of its failure is not straight-
forward. This is because the conception of collective security that can be found in the 
Covenant is far from pure, and subsequent practice (e.g. the 1925 Locarno Treaties) 
magnified that fact (if the old, unstable balance of power had been superseded by 
the League why was Locarno, with its system of mutual guarantees, necessary?) 
Collective security as all professional students of the subject now know is a 
complex matter but it can be said to rest on four precepts. Firstly, the indivisibility of 
peace. This is the idea that a breach of the peace anywhere is a breach of the peace 
everywhere. Aggression is a threat not to this or that nation but to all nations. 
Secondly, the automaticity of sanctions. The response to aggression must not be 
discretionary. All nations have a duty respond to it wherever and whenever it occurs. 
A debate can be had on operational details but a broadly predetermined and 
automatic response there must be. Thirdly, the rejection of neutrality. This follows 
from the indivisibility of peace. Aggression against any state is aggression against 
international society as a whole. Therefore neutrality by definition is impossible. 
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Fourthly, the collective organisation of force. Some means of collectively organising 
the ultimate response, if lesser measures fail, is required. Potential aggressors must 
know that their transgressions will be met ultimately by the force of international 
society as a whole. Otherwise its deterrent effect will be limited.viii 
Either formally or in practice the League fell short of all four of these precepts. 
The first precept was compromised by Article 21 of the Covenant which upheld the 
Monroe doctrine and the special rights of the US in the Americas. The second 
precept was compromised by Article 16 under which military sanctions remained 
discretionary. The third precept was compromised by permitting neutral states, e.g. 
Sweden and Ireland, to join the League without having to abandon their neutral 
status, and by the decision to base the League in the most famous neutral state of 
all, Switzerland. The fourth precept was not so much compromised as shelved. A 
duty was placed on the League Council to ‘recommend’ what military, naval and air 
force members should ‘severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect 
the covenants of the League’ (Article 16). But even if the Council did so recommend 
there was never any suggestion that the League members had any obligation to 
accept it. The use of force remained a sovereign prerogative. No serious attempt 
was made to dissolve it. 
The system of collective security of the League, therefore, was heavily 
compromised from the start. The old system of what Woolf and others decried as 
‘sovereign irresponsibility’ was far from absent. The principle of consent remained 
more or less intact. Neutrality and alliances, staples of the old order, were not 
abolished. The practice of balancing power continued, albeit inconsistently due to 
official ambivalence and public disapprobation. There is a sense therefore that what 
failed in Manchuria, Abyssinia, and elsewhere in the 1930s, was not collective 
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security but the nearest the statesmen of the day, in Paris, could get to it. The clever 
and pious wording of the Covenant, along with subsequent official declarations and 
pronouncements, created the impression that they got nearer to it than they ever in 
fact did. 
This point established we can now consider Woolf’s particular take on the 
League and its system, however imperfect, of collective security. 
 
Woolf and Collective Security 
Woolf provides a fascinating case of the muddle progressive internationalists got into 
over collective security in the1930s. On the one hand their principled attachment to it 
meant that they resisted the temptations of appeasement. They therefore looked 
rather good once appeasement was abandoned with the annexation of rump-
Czechoslovakia in March 1939. On the hand, however, the depth of their 
understanding of the requirements of a proper system of collective security can be 
questioned. In addition, while the deep desire for peace of many appeasers blinded 
them to the reality of the Nazi threat, it can also be asked whether the deep desire 
for peace of many ‘collectivists’ blinded them to just how hostile the international 
environment was to a collective approach to security in the 1930s. 
 To his credit Woolf recognised that an effective system of collective security 
required, as he later put it, ‘effective control of international force adequate to meet 
the threat of national force, international power to prevent the anarchic use of 
national power’.ix He rejected the idea of a permanent international police force as 
extolled most ardently by Lord Davies but felt that some kind of international 
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authority was needed with ‘control of sufficient armed forces’. How this international 
authority or ‘central world authority’ as he sometimes called it differed from an 
international police force he did not specify. He repeatedly asserted that a 
precondition of collective or pooled security was national disarmament. He never 
clarified, however, whether national disarmament meant what later became known 
as ‘general and complete disarmament’ or simply a lower level of national armament 
than currently existed. The difference between the two is potentially vast. In addition, 
if he did mean general and complete disarmament, or something approaching it, he 
never explained how ‘the common obligation to resist an aggressor’ could be met in 
a disarmed world. If he did not mean general and complete disarmament he never 
set out what his optimum level of national disarmament would be. He was attracted 
by the formula of the League Covenant which called for ‘the reduction in national 
armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement 
by common action of international obligations’ (Article 8). But along with fellow 
progressive internationalists he never quite appreciated the cleverness of this 
formula. According to it the level of armaments required could be high, it could be 
low. One gets no guide from the Covenant, nor for that matter from Leonard Woolf. 
As C. A. W. Manning wryly observed about the Covenant ‘while it says very much, it 
says very much less that it seems to’—an observation that could equally be applied 
to the UN Charter.x 
 In common with other League internationalists it seems to be the case with 
Woolf that something magical happens to defence or security once the word 
‘collective’ is put in front of it. The problem with national defence and national 
armament is that it triggers power competition, arms racing, and perhaps a pre-
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emptive war. But what stops collective defence and collective armament doing the 
same? Woolf never got round to asking this vital question. 
 In the early 1930s, much again to his credit, Woolf called on Britain to pursue 
a ‘more militant policy’. Rather than dallying with the fascist powers, and bending 
over backwards to keep them in the League, Woolf wanted Britain to confront them. 
In common with a small number of courageous internationalists such as Norman 
Angell, and one or two courageous nationalists such as Winston Churchill, he 
wanted the League to become ‘an instrument against Fascist militarism’. A League 
‘purged of militarist and Fascist states’ would, he declared, be a ‘much stronger 
instrument of peace than the half-sham League we have today’.xi  Yet Woolf, unlike 
Churchill, stopped short of calling this League an ‘alliance’, a concept he continued 
to denounce. He stopped short of admitting that a ‘more militant policy’ might bring 
nearer the very thing the League and collective security were designed to avoid—
war. 
 War was indeed a problem for Woolf—not only the phenomenon but the very 
word. When talking of collective military action he talks of ‘sanctions’, ‘supporting the 
victims of aggression’, ‘standing by the side of victims of aggression’, and ‘fulfilling 
obligations under the Covenant’. But he never uses the word ‘war’. National violence 
was war but League or collective violence was somehow something else. The 
reason for this is partly psychological partly semantic. Woolf had made up his mind 
that war was ‘vile’, ‘evil’, ‘senseless’, ‘barbarous’ and ‘bestial’. He therefore could not 
bring himself to the realisation that something good like the League might need it for 
its success. He was quick to attack pacifists for not understanding the implications of 
the collective security obligations under the League.xii But he failed to appreciate the 
full implications himself. Or at least he understood them but could not accept them. 
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This it seems to me as an object lesson to those on the Left, and progressives more 
generally, when it comes to foreign and defence policy. There has been insufficient 
scrutiny of words. Nicer sounding words do not amount to a better policy. What the 
words may mean in practice needs very careful scrutiny. ‘Collective action’, 
‘collective defence’, ‘collective enforcement’, ‘military sanctions’, ‘military 
intervention’ all mean war—or at least the willingness to use it as an instrument of 
policy. By virtue of war being collectively waged one hopes for a better outcome. But 
there are no guarantees, and the activity itself remains essentially the same with all 
its unpredictability, vileness, and barbarity—a quality of war Woolf well understood. 
 
Woolf, International Cooperation and Peace 
It was paradoxically Woolf’s deep understanding of the nature of war, particularly 
modern war, which prevented him from acquiring a deeper understanding of the 
requirements of collective security. War in the past was bad enough, but modern 
war—war fought between highly organised, industrialised, nationalistic states 
possessing ever-more deadly weapons—was of an entirely different order. It had to 
be avoided at all costs. But did not Article 16 call on states to use war as the ultimate 
‘sanction’ against ‘aggressive’ war? In any normal sense it did, but the vocabulary of 
collective security as it developed after 1919 provided many on the centre-left 
including Woolf with a means of evading this reality. It was as if the vocabulary itself 
provided a prophylactic against war. If not quite having a stupefying effect, it 
provided a means by which defenders of the League could sound tough while 




Woolf’s record in the area of collective security, however, should not blight his 
broader contribution to thinking about international cooperation and peace. While not 
a political thinker of the first rank—he never quite managed to produce the major 
treatise that is a requirement for this status, though International Government comes 
close—he nonetheless made an important and distinctive contribution. He was an 
early and imaginative thinker on what today we would call ‘global governance’. He 
was a forceful and persistent critic of fatalism and determinism in politics. He showed 
that war was man made, and therefore could be man un-made. He showed that the 
international system was not immutable; progressive change was possible in 
international relations and a good deal of it had already occurred in the form of 
‘every-day internationalism’. Perhaps his most significant contribution, however, was 
to break down the dichotomy, which lamentably still does the rounds today, between 
idealism and realism in world politics. Woolf rightly insisted that having ideals does 
not necessarily make one an idealist, any more than not having ideals makes one a 
realist. Not all ideals are impractical, and the pursuit of ideals whether good or bad—
and there were plenty of bad ones around in the 1930s—is very much a part of the 
landscape of international politics. In a sense Woolf’s career as a writer and publicist 
on international relations was defined by the search for practical ideals. This is the 
reason why there is more interest in him and his work, along with that of other early 
twentieth-century progressive internationalists, now than there was twenty or thirty 
years ago. The international system is not as fluid as progressive internationalists 
assume, nor as tractable as they hope, but the years since Woolf died in 1969 amply 
demonstrate that constructive change can and does take place in international 
relations, however difficult it is to achieve and sustain. 
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